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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH ETHEL DRURY MARSHALL, 
et al., 
Plaintiffs and respondents, 
vs. 
GEORGE T. TAYLER, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 8792 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ruth Ethel Drury Marshall brought action against 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
the defendant, George T. Tayler, for personal injuries 
arising out of an alleged tortious act of the defendant; 
Fern Drury Tayler throu,gh intervention, sought re-
covery for personal injuries to herself rest4ting from the 
same alleged tortious act of the defendant. 
Fern Drury Tayler was the wife of the defendant 
during all the time with which we are concerned. How-
ever, the defendant had filed his action for divorce from 
Fern Drury Tayler prior to the accident complained of 
and said filing regularly resulted in a divorce decree 
being entered on or about October 16, 1956. 
From a jury verdict in the Court below, the appel-
lant appealed his cause to this Honorable Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant's statement of facts contained in his 
brief on appeal is fairly representative of the facts in 
this case with the exceptions and omissions thereto being 
herewith set forth. 
The defendant states that there is "some" testimony 
that he "weaved" his car when backing up from the 
motel the night of the accident which gave rise to plain-
tiff's action for damages, when in fact the husband of 
plaintiff Ruth Ethel Drury Marshall testified that the 
defendant "zig-zagged'. back and forth both in going 
backward and in driving forward after completing his 
backward 1notion (Tr. 121-122). The plaintiff Fern 
Drury Tayler (Tr. 161-162), the plaintiff Ruth Ethel 
Drury Marshall (Tr. 262-266), and the plaintiffs' mother 
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Ethel G. Drury (Tr. 281-282) all testified to this fact. 
Defendant fails to point out in his brief that after back-
ing up in the aforementioned zig-zagging manner the· 
appellant instantly proceeded forward in the same man-
ner and knocked the plaintiff Fern Drury Tayler from 
the automobile by driving so close to a soft-drink ma-
chine that she was slammed forcefully against it (Tr. 
162-163, 263, 265-266). Defendant continued to zig-zag 
under the canopy ·of a service station and drove so close 
to a gas pump that the plaintiff Ruth Ethel Drury Mar-
shall was dragged against it (Tr. 265-266). 
Defendant also alleges in his brief that plaintiffs 
abandoned the theory of intentional injury and ill will 
by the statement of plaintiffs' counsel (Tr.156) that "I 
do not intend to show he had any ill will, your Honor." 
That this statement had reference only to the particular 
facts upon which the questions were then being directed 
is borne out by the failure of defendant's counsel to ask 
for a dismissal of the case at that time upon the grounds 
that the trial, at this point, was proceeding upon the pre-
trial order limiting the issue to intentional injury. Fur-
ther proof upon this point lies in the fact that the case 
was submitted to the jury upon the basis of intentional 
injury which was not objected to by defendant upon the 
ground complained of herein. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK OF INJURY 
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TO THEMSELVES BY PLACING THEMSELVES IN A KNOWN 
POSITION OF PERIL. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT T'RESP ASS UPON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTOR VEHICLE. HOWEVER, EVEN IF PLAINTIFFS WERE 
TRESPASSERS, THE DEFEDANT WAS UNDER A DUTY TO 
EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE TO AVOID INJURING THEM 
AFTER THE DEFENDANT KNEW THEY WERE IN A POSI-
TION OF PERIL. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT OF NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
POINT IV 
·THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF ORDINARY NEGLI-
GENCE TO THE JURY. 
POINT V 
A WIFE DOES HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
HER HUSBAND FOR A NON-INTENTIONAL INJURY IN-
FLICTED BY HER HUSBAND DURING COVERTURE, AND 
ESPECIALLY IS A HUSBAND UNDER A DUTY TO EXERCISE 
REASONABLE CARE TO AVOID INJURING HIS WIFE AFTER 
HE KNOWS SHE IS IN A POSITION OF PERIL. 
ARGUMENT 
· POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK OF INJURY 
TO THEMSELVES BY PLACING THEMSELVES IN A KNOWN 
POSITION OF PERIL. 
Defendant contends that the act of plaintiffs in 
running to the separate sides of defendant's automobile, 
a 1955 Cadillac Coupe deVille, and holding on to the door 
handles thereof constituted an assumption of risk on 
their part for the damages sustained by them. The evi-
dence is undisputed that the plaintiffs did hold on to 
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the handles of the car doors as they leaned over to at-
tempt conversation with the defendant who. was sit-
ting in the driver's seat with the doors and :Vindows 
locked (Tr. 161, 171, 260, 277, 294). Certainly the act 
of holding a door handle on an automobile while carry-
ing on a conversation with one inside the automobile is 
a common, everyday experience for all of us. Such an 
act cannot be said to be inherently dangerous and known 
to be so by those of us who automatically act as th~ 
plaintiffs did in this instance by holding the automobile 
door handle for support while directing conversation to 
the occupant therein. And this is even more common 
in this day and age of low-built automobiles which an 
individual of ordinary height can see entirely over by 
standing erect. The plaintiff Fern Drury Tayler testi-
fied that the sudden jerk and simultaneous weaving of 
the automobile as the defendant put it in reverse motion 
swept her off her feet and she thereafter instinctively 
held on to the door handle to avoid being thrown under 
the weaving wheels of the auto. As the car weaved 
backwards she was unable to regain her balance, and 
the automobile's forW1ard motion was so instantaeous 
with the end of its backward movement that she was 
never able to right herself and would have most as-
suredly been run over had she let go of the door handle. 
In fact she never let go of the door handle until she was 
knocked off the vehicle by being slammed against an 
object, namely a soft-drink vending machine (Tr. 161-
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162). The same situation prevailed as to the plaintiff 
Ruth Ethel Drury Marshall according to her testimony 
(Tr. 262-263'), except that she was eventually dragged 
against a gas pump (Tr. 263, 266). Even this painful 
experience did not cause her to let go of the door handle 
for fear of her life and it was not until the defendant's 
automobile headed for the open highway, at the same 
time picking up terrific speed, that she felt her better 
chance for survival required her to let go of the door 
handle (Tr. 266). Contrary to defendant's allegations, 
neither of the plaintiffs were in a known position of 
danger until the defendant's wrongful act swept them 
from their feet and from that time on they acted as any 
reasonable person under the circumstances would have 
acted. They were then faced with the choice of dropping 
off the automobile and risking their lives under the vi-
ciously weaving wheels or to continue to hold on to the 
door handles in the hope that ordinary, human compas-
sion would lead the defendant to relieve them from their 
peril. That they chose the latter course is not surpris-
ing - in fact it is reasonable to assume that any or-
dinary individual under like circumstances would have 
acted in the same manner. And the jury, upon proper 
instruction by the court on the doctrine of assumption 
of risk, so found (R. 73, 84, 88). The authorities cited 
by defendant thus have no application to the facts of 
this case, and this court should not, as a matter of law, 
reverse the jury's findings upon the alleged defense of 
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assumption of risk. Defendant relies upon the tests laid 
down by this court in Clay v. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 
P. 2d 1075, as supporting his defense. The tests outlined 
therein for a valid defense of assumption of risk included 
(1) that the plaintiff must have looked, must have seen 
and mmst have known of the danger, and (2) that he 
volutarily subjected himself thereto. As stated by the 
·court in that case, "knowledge of the risk is the watch-
word of * * * assumption of risk." It is respectfully 
submitted that these plaintiffs had no knowledge of any 
risk based upon a visual and considered appraisal of 
conditions confronting them until their very survival 
depended upon their ability to cling to the door handles 
of defendant's automobile. In this regard the jury was 
in unanimous agreement. See the case of Byers v. Gunn 
discussed under Point II wherein the plaintiff and three 
others had seated themselves upon the front fenders and 
hood of defendant's car after b~ing refused admittance 
and plaintiff was thereafter thrown from the car and 
injured. In that case the court held that the plaintiff 
was not guilty of assumption of risk or contributory 
negligence as a matter of law and refused to interfere 
with the jury's conclusion in these matters after it was 
properly instructed by the trial court. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ·TRESPASS UPON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTOR VEHICLE. HOWEVER, EVEN IF PLAINTIFFS WERE 
TRESPASSERS, THE DEFENDANT WAS UNDER A DUTY TO 
EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE TO AVOID INJURING THEM 
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AFTE'R THE DEFENDANT KNEW THEY WERE IN A POSI-
TION OF PERIL. 
A trespasser is defined as "One who has committed 
trespass; one who unlawfully enters or intrudes upon 
another's land, or unlawfully and forcibly takes an-
other's personal property." Black's Law Dictionary. A 
"trespass' is a transgression or wrongful act, and in its 
most extensive signification includes every description 
of wrong, and a "trespasser" is one who does an unlaw-
ful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner, to the 
injury of the person or property of another. Carter v. 
Haynes, (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas), 269 S.W. 216. 
It is difficult to see how the plaintiffs in this case (one 
the wtie of the defendant- the other his sister-in-law) c.~-liA 
liJ? tl« be held to be trespassers uj>on the defendant's 
automobile. They testified that they only wanted to 
talk to the defendant (Tr. 161, 260-261), and they had 
no intention of interfering with his possession of the 
automobile (Tr. 171, 277-278). Certainly this wife had 
the right to converse with her husband and to hope that 
he might respond. It would seem that the same privilege 
of communication should extend to his sister-in-law 
without constituting a trespass. Their holding of the 
automobile handles for the mere purpose of balance 
while attempting to converse with the defendant did 
not in any manner conflict with his possessory interest 
in the automobile nor did they cause any injury or ex-
ercise dominion over this automobile in any way damag-
ing to the defendant. We respectfully submit that this 
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act of plaintiffs in holding o~to the door handles of this 
automobile did at no time constitute a trespass upon the 
defendant's motor vehicle. It is certainly an ordinary 
occurrence for a w.ife to exercise dominion over her 
husband's automobile to a much greater degree than the 
mere holding of its door handles before being considered 
a "trespasser". 
However, even if these plaintiffs were to be con-
sidered trespassers, the defendant would have no reason 
to complain of the negligence verdict in this case. It is 
a true statement of the law that the operator of an auto-
mobile owes to trespassers only the duty to refrain from 
wantonly or willfully causing injury to them after their 
presence becomes known to the driver. BUT where the 
operator knows that the trespasser is in a position of 
peril, he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
avoid injuring him. Voltz v. Orange Volunteer Fire As-
sociation, 118 Conn. 307, 172 A. 220; Ice Delivery Com-
pany v. Thomas, 290. Ky. 230, 160 S.W.2d. 37. Defendant 
cites the case of Byers v. Gunn, Florida, 81, So.2d. 723, in 
support of their claim when in fact that case is directly 
in point in this case to support the plaintiffs' position. 
In the Gunn case the defendant's minor daughter, while 
driving her father's automobile, had stopped at a stop 
street. Four youngsters, including the plaintiff, ap-
proached the car and asked for a ride, which was re-
fused. The daughter rolled up the windows and locked 
the doors, whereupon the four intruders sat down on 
the front fenders and hood of the car. The driver started 
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the car in motion and, after attaining speeds up to 40 
miles per hour, stepped on the brake causing the plain-
tiff to be thrown off and severely injured. The Supreme. 
Court of Florida, affirming the lower court, allowed the 
plaintiff to recover upon a verdict of negligence. In so 
holding the court stated: 
The injured girl was a trespasser and the 
trial judge so informed the jury. The rule of law 
is clear that the standard of care owed to a tres-
passer is to refrain from committing a willful or 
wanton injury. This rule, however, gives way 
to the further proposition that after discovery of 
the peril to a trespasser, the driver of the auto-
mobile is then duty-bound to exercise reasonable 
care and caution under the circumstances. Ab-
sent contributory negligence on the part of the 
injured person there would appear to be no justi-
fiable excuse for injuring a person in a position 
of manifest peril if such injury can be reasonably 
avoided, or as otherwise stated, if such injury 
can be avoided by the exercise of reasonable 
care and caution in the light of all the circum-
stances in the particular case. 
The court further held in this case that it could not be 
concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence or assumption of risk, 
and that the court was not justified in substituting its 
judgement for that of the jury. 
There can be no question but that the defendant in 
this case was aware of the peril of the plaintiffs after he 
put his automobile in motion. The weaving and zig-
zagging previously referred to was aimed directly at 
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dislodging the plaintiffs from their precarious positions 
in being dragged while holding the door handles of the 
automobile. Furthermore it was testified on behalf of 
plaintiffs that th~re was no reason for defendant to drive 
under the canopy of the service station (Tr. 151, 163-
164). The fact that one plaintiff was slammed against 
a cola vending machine and the other against a gas pump 
as a result of this choice of direction by defendant is too 
far outside the realm of chance to have been accidental. 
The defendant himself testified that the plaintiffs were 
hanging on to his car handles (Tr. 335, 336). He also 
testifi~d that "I looked to the side of me, and it seemed 
to me, I saw Fern drop off." (Tr. 295). Also "I saw 
Ruth's head bouncing up and down" (Tr. 295), and "I 
pulled along and I kept on going, until Ruth finally saw 
I was going, and she let go, and when she did, I knew 
she had made a mistake." (Tr. 296). The jury found 
that the defendant did not use due care for the safety 
of the plaintiffs (R. 83, 86) and that plaintiffs did not 
asssume the risk of injury to themselves (R. 84, 88) nor 
were they contributorily negligent (R. 84, 87). In view 
of the above the verdict of the jury must be sustained. 
POINT III 
TH.E COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT OF· NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
We shall first consider that portion of defendant's 
motion asking for a directed verdict based upon the 
ground that plaintiffs committed an assault upon him. 
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An assault is any act of such a nature as to excite an 
apprehension of a battery. It is well settled law that 
an assault must amount to an offer to use force and there 
must be an apparent present ability and opportunity to 
carry out the threat immediately. Prosser on Torts, §10, 
p. 50;Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hill, 25 Ala. App. 540, 
150 So. 709. In this case there is no evidence whatso-
ever of an offer to use force upon the defendant by the 
plaintiffs, and certainly no threat nor threatening move-
ment on the part of the plaintiffs. In fact the evidence 
is conclusive that the plaintiffs nor no members of their 
families had ever threatened the defendant - in fact 
they were very good friends, including plaintiff Mar-
shall's husband (Tr. 114, 170, 178), and the plaintiff 
Marshall (Tr. 275). Plaintiff Tayler testified that she 
had never had an altercation with her husband, the de-
fendant, nor did they ever have a violent argument in 
the sense that either lost his temper and struck the 
other (Tr. 155). In fact the record indicates only one 
argument in which any of the principals in this action 
were active and the record is conclusive upon the fact 
that the defendant precipitated the whole argument by 
referring to the plaintiff's grandmother as a "wicked, 
cruel old witch" upon being shown her picture (Tr. 177, 
257, 290). The defendant even admits that Mr. Marshall 
took no part in this exchange of words (Tr. 290). 
Indicative of the defendant's entire failure to make 
out an assault upon him at the time of the accident here 
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involved are the following portions of his testimony: 
"* * * and if she (Mrs. Marshall) could stall 
me until Monty (Mr. Marshall) got out of the 
truck - the danger was coming from Monty, not 
these two women." (Tr. 343). 
"When I looked back, Mr. Marshall \vas cqm-
ing between the service station * * * and I did not 
know whether he had anything in his hand or not. 
I could not see because of the darkness." 
Upon being asked if he saw something in his hand, he 
answered "No, I could not see." (Tr. 366). 
"I was more or less afraid of Mr. Marshall, 
and Mr. Marshall is a tire man. I did not know 
what he would do in a case where I am going to 
drive away * * *. 
Mr. Marshall is a very fine man. Mr. Mar-
shall and myself never had any trouble * * * ." 
And in answer to the question whether defendant ever 
knew of Mrs. Marshall suggesting to her husband that 
he beat up the defendant, the defendant answered "No." 
(Tr. 332). 
"As I looked out the back of my car, I saw 
Mr. Marshall coming through between the pumps 
of the service station. Now whether he would do 
anything, I don't know, but I knew he was com-
ing, and I was not taking any chances * * * ." (Tr. 
296). 
"I am not afraid of Mr. Marshall * * * ." (Tr. 
333). 
The evidence clearly indicates, that no time was de-
fendant faced with a threat of battery or the use of force 
let alone the further requisite of present apparent ability 
on the part of plaintiffs to carry into effect any imagined 
violence on the person of the defendant. The courts have 
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been reluctant to protect extremely timid individuals 
from exaggerated fears of contact, and have required 
quite· uniformly that the apprehension be one which 
would normally be aroused in the mind of a reasonable 
person. Prosser on Torts, supra. The defendant clearly 
intended to avoid any conversation with the plaintiffs 
and the plaintiffs' pleadings with defendant to let them 
talk to him cannot be said to constitute an assault upon 
him. 
As to the defendant's second ground for a directed 
verdict based upon the theory of plaintiffs being tres-
passers and guilty of assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, we refer the Court to our 
argument under Points I and II. For the reasons stated in 
Point II, the plainti~fs were not trespassers, and even if 
they were, the defendant owed them the duty to exercise 
reasonable care to avoid injuring them after their posi-
tion of peril became apparent to him. For the reasons 
stated under Point I, plaintiffs were not guilty of as-
sumption of risk. For the same reasons the plaintiffs 
were not contributorily negligent. The juTy, being 
properly instructed upon these points without exception 
being taken thereto by defendant, found the plaintiffs 
to be free of contributory negligence and this court 
should not, as a matter of law, inter}Aiere with that find-
ing. Defendant cites to the court many rulings of this 
court to the effect that contributory negligence becomes 
a question of law where the evidence is such that reason-
able minds could not differ that the conduct in question 
failed to meet the standard of due care. These cases are 
absolutely correct, but we cannot agree with defendant 
that reasonable minds could not differ upon the standard 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
of care exercised by plaintiffs in this case. We submit 
that the act of holding onto an automobile door handle 
while conversing, or attempting to converse, with one 
inside the automobile cannot be said to violate the stand-
ard of due care. And plaintiffs' continued grasp on the 
door handles after being swept from their feet by defend-
ant's wrongful action certainly cannot be said to fail the 
test of due care, as a matter of law, when the only alter-
native at that time was to drop off and risk their lives 
under the weaving wheels of the automobile. We fur-
ther submit that defendant's argument to the effect that 
the plaintiffs should have released the door handles dur-
ing that fleeting moment that the automobile necessarily 
stood still when changing from reverse to forward mo-
tion is not satisfactory in light of the facts as testified 
by plaintiffs, and apparently believed by the jury, that 
they were unable to perceive of any immobility of the 
automobile and were unable to regain their balance be-
fore the defendant's forward weaving motion continued 
them in their position of peril. To say that reasonable 
minds could not differ as to lack of due care shown by 
plaintiffs under these circumstances would do violence 
to all concepts of justice. In fact it would seem more con-
scionable to hold that reasonable minds must conclude 
that the conduct of plaintiffs met every standard of due 
care. The minds of eight reasonable jurymen so con-
cluded. 
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POINT IV 
·THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO SUBMI'T THE ISSUE OF ORDINARY NEGLI-
GENCE TO THE JURY. 
As to defendant's further reiteration of his claim 
that plaintiffs were trespassers, we herewith incorporate 
the argument set forth in our Point II. 
POINT V 
A WIFE DOES HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
HER HUSBAND FOR A NON-INTENTIONAL INJURY IN-
FLICTED BY HER HUSBAND DURING COVERTURE, AND 
ESPECIALLY IS A HUSBAND UNDER A DUTY TO EXERCISE 
REASONABLE CARE ·TO AVOID INJURING HIS WIFE AFTER 
HE KNOWS SHE IS IN A POSITION OF PERIL. 
The record in this case is conclusive that defendant 
had filed his suit for divorce from plaintiff Fern Drury 
Tayler sometime prior to the date of the accident com-
plained of (Tr. 168-169, 285) and the divorce decree was 
granted defendant on or about October 16, 1956 (Tr. 
290). And the record -is further conclusive that the 
defendant and his wife, plaintiff Fern Drury Tayler, 
were not living together at the time of the injury which 
precipitated this action, nor were they living together 
under the same roof at any time during their entire 5lj2 
years of marriage (Tr. 153-154, 167-168, 194-195, 198-
201, 208, 285-286, 291, 302-303, 306, 323). 
Defendant relies upon the limitation of this Court's 
opinion based upon the facts in the case of Taylor v. 
Patten, 2 Utah 2d. 404, 275 P.2d 696, to sustain his argu-
ment that a wife may not sue her husband for a non-
intentional injury inflicted by the husband during cov-
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erture. In that case, an action against plaintiff's former 
husband for assault on plaintiff while they were living 
apart during the interlocutory period of their divorce 
action, this Court ruled that, under statutes then exisit-
ing and unchanged at the present time, "* * * a wife 
may recover from her husband for intentionally inflicted 
injuries." This holding was necessarily restrictive be-
cause of the facts presented by the case. However, in 
arriving at this conclusion, the court was presented with 
the problem of whether our Husband and Wife statutes 
removed the disability of a wife to sue or be sued at 
common law without regard to the nature of the action 
or the intent involved. In arriving at his conclusion 
Justice Wade reasoned thus: 
* * * Under modern Husband and Wife stat-
utes, such as ours, this fiction has been completely 
eliminated and the wife has been completely 
emancipated from this inability to own, control 
and manage her property, and from her inability 
to sue or be sued for the protection of her proper-
ty and personal rights. The reason for her ina-
bility and lack of rights has been completely elim-
inated with the logical result that such courts hold 
her disabilities and loss of rights have completely 
disappeared with the common law fiction that the 
husband and wife are one. Since the reason on 
which that disability was based has been elimi-
nated, it is not necessary now to have an addition-
aL express statutory provision declaring that mar-
riage does not disable a party thereto in enforcing 
tort liability against the other spouse. 
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There is nothing in the above reasoning of the Court 
which would indicate that the removal of the wife's 
common law disabilities under our statutes., should be 
/n:lt-,,IDhrti~/!J', 
construed to include only redress for inteR-tig~taJ. in-
flicted injuries. Quite to the contrary, the use of terms 
such as "completely eliminated", "completely emanci-
pated", "completely disappeared", and "marriage does 
not disable a party thereto in enforcing tort liability 
against the other spouse" indicate the Court's feeling that 
the entire field of a wife's common law disabilities, in-
cluding the right to sue her husband for injuries inflicted 
negligently as well as intentionally, was abrogated by 
the Utah statutes. 
As a further indication of this Court's recognition 
of the right of a married woman to sue her husband for 
negligent tort we further quote from the Taylor v. Patten 
case: 
* * * From the foregoing it is clear that the 
legislature intended to establish the separate 
identity of the husband and wife in all property 
and personal rights the same as if they were not 
married. Giving these statutes a liberal construc-
tion to effect their objects and in the interest of 
justice requires us to hold that a wife can sue and 
be sued the same as if she were unmarried. * * * 
In the case of Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 
889, an action by a wife against her husband to recover 
damages for assault and battery and false imprison-
ment, the court, in holding that the action would lie 
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under the Connecticut .Married Woman's Act, said: 
* * * The right to contract with the husband, 
and to sue him for breach of contract, and to sue 
for torts, is not given to the wife by the statute. 
These are rights which belonged to her before 
marriage, and, because of the new marriage status 
created by the statute, are not lost by the fact of 
marriage, as they were under the common-lavv 
status. The status of the parties after marriage 
being fixed, there was no occasion for providing 
in express terms what the consequences would be. 
They followed logically. * * * 
In Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432, 
44 A.L.R. 785, the Connecticut court applied the decision 
in Brown v. Brown to a case of neglience. Likewise, 
the following cases have permitted a wife to sue her 
husband for negligent tort under similar married wo-
men's statutes: Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 
P.2d 660; Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 140 So. 378; 
Katzenberg v. Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696; 
Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740; Roberts v. 
Roberts, 185 N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9, 29 A.L.R. 1479; Fitz-
maurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526; Fon-
taine v. Fontaine, 205 Wis. 570, 238 N.W. 410; Brown v. 
Gosser (Ky.), 262 S.W. 2d. 480. 
As was stated in the exhaustive study of this prob-
lem in the Courtney case, supra: "Nor can the difference 
in the nature of the torts committed be seriously con-
sidered from a legal standpoint * * *. In the case of a 
negligent tort, the wife has suffered a wrong for which 
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the law· should provide a remedy just as in the case of 
wilful tort." 
In light of the above authorities, and the reasoning 
employed by this Court in arriving at its conclusion in 
the Taylor v. Patten case, plaintiffs submit that the Utah 
statutes do, in fact, accomplish a complete emancipation 
for married women from their common-law disabilities 
including the right to sue their spouses for injuries re-
sulting from negligent, as well as wilful, tort. 
And, assuming for sake of argument, that the rule 
in Taylor v. Patten does in fact negate the recovery by 
a wife against her husband for negligent conduct, plain-
tiffs are of the opinion that the exception to the require-
ment of intentional injury in the case of trespassers 
would be applicable to this case, namely that the defend-
ant was under a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
avoid injuring his wife after he discovered her in a 
position of peril. An operator of an automobile owes to 
trespassers only the duty to refrain from intentionally 
causing injury to them, but where the trespasser is in a 
position of peril known to the operator, he is then under 
the duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring 
the trespasser. Byers v. Gunn, supra. We can see no 
difference in that case and the one posed by defendant 
assuming that plaintiff Tayler could recover only for 
intentional acts of the defendant. We incorporate our 
arguments set forth in Point II as equally applicable to 
the situation herein assumed. 
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The serious consequences which have often been 
suggested as the reason for eliminating the disability at 
common law of a married woman to sue her husband 
for his tortious acts simply have not materialized. This 
Court recognized this fact in the Taylor v. Patten case, 
supra, when it made note of the fact that the number of 
states which do allow such a recovery is constantly in-
creasing. Likewise the legal writers have followed al-
most unanimously the growing minority. Prosser on 
Torts, §99, p. 904, has this to say on the subject: 
An exhaustive analysis of the problem in a 
recent Oklahoma decision (Courtney v. Courtney, 
supra) seems to leave no justification for the 
majority rule except that of historical survival. 
Defendant cites an exhaustive annotation, 43 ALR 2d 634, 
in which the majority rule is referred to as a "dwindling 
majority." This undisputed fact that the jurisdictions 
embracing the doctrine of a wife's right to sue her hus-
band in tort are steadily increasing is most significant of 
the fitness of such a rule to assimilate itself with the 
public policy and needs of the present day. This court 
having taken the proper step forward by its decision in 
Taylor v. Patten, supra, should not now reverse itself 
and thereby adopt an outmoded and archaic fiction, 
born of the "dark ages", which is now withering and 
destined to die upon the vine of progress. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case clearly sustains the j udg-
ment of the lower court. Plaintiffs were not trespassers 
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upon the property of the defendant, nor were they guilty 
of assault, contributory negligence or assumption of 
risk for their resultant injuries. These injuries were 
the sole result of defendant's negligence in failing tQ 
exercise the ordinary degree of care required of him 
toward the plaintiffs, and the jury so found upon proper 
instruction. 
This Court has, upon mature reflection and analysis, 
aligned itself with the decisions of a rapidly growing 
minority by heretofore holding that a married woman, 
under our statute, may sue her husband for injuries suf-
fered as a result of his tortious acts upon her person in-
cluding negligent as well as intentional violations there-
of, and, therefore, the judgment of the lower court should 
be affirmed, and plaintiffs awarded their costs on this 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted 
ROMNEY AND NELSON 
DONN E. CASSITY 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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